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This paper explores the links between macroeconomic conditions and individual bank risk. 
Using capital adequacy ratios as a broad measure of risk sustainability, a linear mixed 
effects model for a large international panel of banks for the years 2001-2005 is estimated. 
In OECD countries, banks tend to hold higher capital ratios during business cycle highs, 
this effect being even stronger for a subsample of EU banks. In non-OECD countries, 
periods of higher economic growth are associated with lower capital ratios. This indicates 
procyclical behavior. Banks accumulate risks more rapidly in economically good times and 
some of these risks materialize as asset quality deteriorates during subsequent recessions. 
Furthermore, higher inflation rates are associated with higher capital ratios of banks, 
implying that inflation-induced economic uncertainty stimulates banks to restrict credit. As 
far as regulatory and institutional environment is concerned, econometric estimates show 
that banks in non-OECD countries with deposit insurance tend to be more risky, whereas 
evidence of a negative relationship between concentration of the banking sector and banks’ 
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1.  Motivation 
The goal of this paper is to explore the links between macroeconomic fundamentals and 
bank risk in an international perspective. Although negative consequences of adverse 
macroeconomic events are not limited to the banking sector alone, it has been recognized 
that banks play a special role in the economy, and their failure markedly reinforces the 
adverse developments that may have caused them to fail (Sijben 2002, p. 363). Given that 
banks are theoretically more prone to (economically undesirable) risk taking than non-
financial institutions (Hellwig 1995) and that weak macroeconomic fundamentals 
simultaneously affect a large number of institutions, it is all the more important to 
understand macroeconomic influences on risk positions of banks. 
Empirical studies that model the relationship between macroeconomic factors and 
individual bank risk are relatively rare (e.g., Buch et al. 2007, Wedow 2006, Baele/Vander 
Vennet et al. 2004). Most research linking banking risks and macroeconomic environment 
addresses episodes of banking crises. Detailed reviews of their approaches can be found in 
Bell/Pain (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt/Detragiache (2005). These studies include papers 
that focus on country level positions as well as those that use both individual bank data and 
macroeconomic data. One line of research was on the connection between financial 
liberalization and bank crises, finding that excessive risk taking is a likely result of 
liberalization that lacks sufficient prudential regulation and adequate supervising 
institutions. Another line of research focused on international shocks and the connection 
between the exchange rate regime and bank crises. Here conclusions diverge, since 
researchers find evidence both „pro“ and „contra“ a fixed exchange rate regime’s ability to 
reduce the likelihood of bank crises as well as evidence of equal susceptibility to crises 
under fixed and floating exchange rate regimes alike.  
Although this literature provides valuable insights concerning bank risk and identifies 
macroeconomic conditions that are associated with banking vulnerabilities, this kind of 
research focuses on crises episodes only. This leaves out a vast banking universe elsewhere 
that is having a “tranquil” time. Even or perhaps particularly in tranquil times assumption 
and transformation risks remains the core function of banking. Therefore, extending 
empirical research to individual bank risk and linking it to macroeconomic factors in non-




This paper provides a broad-based cross-country time-series econometric analysis of 
possible correlations between macroeconomic conditions and bank risk at the individual 
bank level. In section 2, theoretical hypotheses of linkages between macroeconomic factors 
and risk-taking behavior of banks are formulated. Section 3 describes the data and the 
empirical model used to test the hypotheses. As a broad measure of bank risk, capital 
adequacy ratios for a large international panel of banks from the Bankscope database are 
used. Higher capital ratios imply greater loss resilience and less risk of financial distress. 
Robustness tests are conducted with capital over risk (unweighted) assets as a dependent 
variable. To account for the hierarchical structure of the data set, a linear mixed effects 
model with random country and bank intercepts is estimated. The empirical analysis 
distinguishes between banks domiciled in OECD, the countries of the EU-15, and non-
OECD countries.  
Section 4 presents estimation results for the model. In economically advanced countries, 
banks tend to hold higher capital ratios during business cycle highs, whereas in non-OECD 
countries, capital ratios are lower in periods of rapid economic growth. Furthermore, 
higher inflation rates are associated with higher capital buffers of banks, implying that 
inflation-induced economic uncertainty stimulates banks to ration credit. Currency 
appreciation appears to have a negative, albeit statistically less robust, relationship with 
bank risk in OECD countries. Also, no robust results can be reported on the connection of 
bank risk with the terms of trade and market interest rates. Section 4 also contains results 
for bank level variables as well as country level variables that reflect institutional/ 
regulatory environment. In line with theoretical predictions, the existence of an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme in non-OECD countries is shown to be conducive to higher risk 
taking by banks, whereas a negative relationship between concentration (higher 
concentration meaning higher charter values of banks) and banks’ risk taking holds for 
most model setups, but fails to be confirmed in baseline regressions with OECD banks. 
Section 5 concludes. Olga Bohachova  IAW Diskussionspapier Nr. 44 
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2.  Theoretical hypotheses linking bank risk to macroeconomic 
fundamentals 
2.1  Business cycle conditions 
Since banks perform intermediary functions for the real sector, they are exposed to 
business cycle conditions that largely determine the aggregate health of the real sector. As 
economic conditions worsen during stagnation and recession periods, the riskiness of 
intermediation tends to rise. Banks are vulnerable to adverse selection and moral hazard 
behavior of their borrowers. These are forms of information asymmetries, and asymmetric 
information and agency costs have been shown to be typically high during business cycle 
troughs (Baele/Vander Vennet 2005). Furthermore, an economic slowdown is likely to 
have a negative effect on bank profits because typically low interest rates in a recession 
contribute to the erosion of banks’ interest margins. Also, fee revenues are likely to fall in 
the environment of declining stock markets and the lack of merger and acquisition deals. In 
sum, it can be expected that bank risk is correlated negatively with the business cycle, 
rising at times when economic activity slows.  
It should be noted that cyclical downturns are not always the cause of higher riskiness in 
banking, they can also help reveal weaknesses in bank risk structures that were built up 
during business cycle upturns. There is evidence that financial systems tend to behave 
procyclically, that is, business and financial cycles co-move.
1 In an economic upturn, when 
collateral value is high, banks lend funds more readily and asset (credit) growth 
accelerates. Depending on a bank’s risk practices, this may sow the seeds of excessive 
credit risk that will become apparent in a subsequent recession, once profitability of bank 
borrowers deteriorates and their loan servicing ability as well as the value of their collateral 
declines.
2 Thus it may be necessary to distinguish between the magnitude of risk that a 
bank already has on its balance sheet and its concurrent risk-taking behavior. For instance, 
in a business cycle downturn the bank may in fact behave more risk-aversely by tightening 
                                                 
1  A financial cycle is defined as the sequence of rapid credit expansion and asset price increases and their 
reversals that can end in financial distress. The direction of causation in these co-movements – whether the 
business cycle influences the financial one or vice versa – is a matter of debate, and researches have seen 
in the crises in Asia and Latin America in the 1990s evidence on the causal role of financial factors (Borio 
et al. 2001). A possible scenario is mutual causation, with one type of cycle reinforcing the other. 
2  In the 1990s this was the background of banking problems in Japan, the US, the UK, Australia, Sweden, 
Norway, Finland as well as in emerging markets. In Japan, banking distress was connected with the 
bursting of the asset price bubble and was exacerbated but not directly caused by the following recession 




credit conditions for new borrowers while the risk associated with its assets – acquired 
previously – may still increase due to factors mentioned above.  
2.2  Exchange rate fluctuations 
The theoretical impact of exchange rate fluctuations on bank risk depends on the interplay 
between currency moves and a bank’s foreign exchange exposure. Domestic currency 
depreciation can be expected to hurt banks whose foreign exchange liabilities substantially 
exceed their assets denominated in foreign currencies. However, Lindgren et al. (1996) 
identify the effect of exchange rate levels on the performance of banks’ borrowers as its 
primary impact on bank profitability, i.e., they attach greater importance to the connection 
between exchange rate and credit risk than to currency risk as such. On aggregate, 
domestic currency depreciation is likely to increase credit risk for bank loans extended to 
importers and decrease credit risk of the exporting sector. Changes in a bank’s overall risk 
position will be determined by its net exposure to exporting or importing corporate 
borrowers. Exchange rate moves are likely to have a different effect on banks with 
different kinds of exposure.  
The magnitude of exchange rate moves can be a risk source of its own. Excessive 
exchange rate volatility impairs economic and financial stability in a country and was 
found to have played a significant role in inducing banking crises in many countries 
(Lindgren et al. 1996). Given the fairly “crude” measure of exchange rate fluctuations used 
in subsequent empirical analysis (annual percentage change of the exchange rate), it is the 
meaning of these kinds of moves that our econometric model may help reveal. A 
sufficiently strong depreciation of a currency can be expected to induce disintermediation 
and increase bank risk as depositors withdraw their money and seek to invest it in “hard” 
currency assets.  
2.3  Shifts in the terms of trade 
Shifts in the terms of trade also affect bank risks by influencing the profitability of bank 
borrowers, that is, they too primarily affect credit risk. A drop in the terms of trade occurs 
when imports become more expensive relative to exports, eroding the purchasing power in 
a country. Falling terms of trade can be expected to increase banks’ credit risk. Olga Bohachova  IAW Diskussionspapier Nr. 44 
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An empirical motivation for considering the terms of trade in our model comes from 
numerous historical examples suggesting that a worsening in the terms of trade can have a 
detrimental impact on the banking system. Shifts in the terms of trade were an important 
factor in banking problems in Chile in the early 1980s, Malaysia in the mid-1980s as well 
as countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union 
republics in the early 1990s (Lindgren et al. 1996, p. 52). Deterioration in the terms of 
trade on the order of 10 percent or more seems to have systematically preceded banking 
crises, as documented by Kaminsky/Reinhart (1999) and Caprio et al. (1997).  
2.4  Interest rate changes 
Interest rate risk associated with changes in market interest rates constitutes a central 
source of market risk for banks. Besides, a rise in market interest rates, whose direct effect 
is an increase in bank returns for newly made or variable interest loans, nonetheless bears a 
danger of increased credit risk. In the light of asymmetric information theories, higher 
interest rates tend to exacerbate the problem of adverse selection – that is, in the context of 
credit relationships, the selection of borrowers with high probability of adverse project 
outcomes, or “bad risks.” High interest rates will deter potential borrowers with safe 
projects, so that the risk composition of the pool of loan applicants will shift toward bad 
risks. Moreover, a rise in interest rates will change the ex post incentives for borrowers 
inducing them to take on riskier projects (borrowers’ moral hazard) (Stiglitz/Weiss 1981). 
Thus, in a setting of information asymmetries a rise in interest rates will ceteris paribus 
increase credit risk on banks’ balance sheets. 
2.5  Inflation 
An increased rate of inflation diminishes real rates of return on bank assets and therefore 
induces credit rationing. Consequently, high inflation countries will have less financial 
intermediation (Boyd et al. 2001). While there is evidence that higher rates of inflation lead 
to a decrease in the quantity of bank assets and thus the quantity of credit risks, higher 
inflation can have a negative impact on earnings of existing borrowers thereby impairing 
the quality of previously extended loans. If the credit rationing effect proves to be stronger, 
higher inflation rates may result, ceteris paribus, in banks taking fewer risks on their 




On the other hand, not only high inflation, but also disinflation can have a detrimental 
impact on the financial sector and increase bank risk. Rapid disinflation in a previously 
high-inflation environment will result in high real interest rates that will exert a contracting 
influence on the economy and raise credit risk both due to shrinking profits of borrowers 
and increased risk incentives similar to those accompanying a rise in nominal interest rates 
(Mishkin 1996).  
 
3.  Data and empirical model 
3.1  Data and sample construction 
Banking data used for subsequent empirical analysis of theoretical hypotheses presented in 
section 2 are taken from the Bankscope database that includes accounting and structural 
data on over 25,000 banks worldwide (BvDEP 2007). In the first step, all banks for which 
end-year information on assets, loans and equity is available in the years 1999 through 
2005 are included in the sample. Observations were dropped on banks with negative equity 
as well as banks from countries for which macroeconomic data were not available. 
Macroeconomic and institutional data come from the International Country Risk Guide, the 
World Development Indicators, Beck et al. (2000, updated 2007),  Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2005) – all available online – as well as Datastream and cover the years 2001-2005.  
Extending the time frame in this study would constrain it to a much smaller sample of 
countries since the data for earlier years is not available for over a half of countries in the 
sample. Since the main subjects of interest for this study – country-level macroeconomic 
indicators – do not have within-country variation in a given year, a larger number of 
countries in the sample create a wider field of cross-sectional between-country variation. 
Depending on the model specification and availability of macro data, our sample contains 
34 to 120 countries with a total of 1,832 to 4,931 banks, respectively. Over the whole 
period of five years the sample contains a maximum of 24,202 observations. A list of 
countries and numbers of banks is included in TABLE 1.  
Having a large number of countries and banks in the sample allows testing the models on 
more homogenous subsamples. Baseline regressions will be run for subsamples of banks Olga Bohachova  IAW Diskussionspapier Nr. 44 
 
 
  8 
domiciled in OECD and non-OECD countries as well as a subsample of banks in the “old” 
European Union (EU-15).
3 
3.2  Quantifying bank risk 
A big challenge for the empirical model at hand is to identify an appropriate measure of 
bank risk. In theoretical discussions, the term „bank risk“ often implies expected and/or 
unexpected losses (in the statistical sense) for a bank or a group of banks, where 
„’expected losses’ refer to the average or mean losses anticipated over a particular period, 
while ‚unexpected losses’ refer to a measure of the dispersion, or degree of uncertainty that 
surrounds that outcome“ (Borio et al. 2001, p.  3). For the purposes of econometric 
modeling, however, this is not an observable measure of bank risk for our sample and a 
risk proxy is needed.  
Various proxies for bank risk have been suggested in literature. A measure of risk that is 
frequently used in academic research is derived from stock price developments (stock 
returns, beta, and volatility). Stock data as a basis for calculating bank risk has the 
advantage of good availability and high frequency, but also the limitation that it can only 
be used for exchange-listed banks and therefore would not be applicable for a substantial 
number of banks in our sample. Moreover, its ability to reflect bank risk is closely linked 
to the degree of capital market efficiency as well as banks’ transparency, since share prices 
inform about bank conditions as they are being perceived  by investors. Research by 
Hyytinen (2002) suggests that this link is not necessarily sufficient. He investigates 
changes in investors’ perceptions of the banking sector’s systematic risk prior und during 
banking crises in Norway, Sweden and Finland in the late 1980s – early 1990s and finds 
that the distressed state of the banking sector was correctly reflected in the risk parameters 
of bank stocks only when banking distress became apparent, that is, banking sector 
weaknesses that led to the crises were not “noticed” by investors “until the damage had 
been done and severe problems begun to realize in full“ (Hyytinen 2002, p. 621).  
Another risk measure that has become increasingly popular in academic research involves 
ratings assigned to banks by commercial rating agencies (Sironi 2003, Demirgüç-Kunt et 
                                                 
3    Particularly in the EU the long-time political and economic unification processes as well as the 
introduction of the euro are likely to have created a fairly homogenous banking environment in comparison 
with other country constellations. See also Baele/Ferrando et al. (2004) for evidence on the (high) degree 




al. 2006). Since Bankscope does not provide time series on ratings, this potentially 
attractive risk measure cannot be used in our panel setting. Besides, a wave of rating 
downgrades that came in the wake of the ongoing subprime credit crisis showed that rating 
adjustments, like adjustments of stock beta, may come significantly later than the 
accumulation of risks. 
De Nicolo (2001) uses a time average of the capital-to-assets ratio adjusted for the mean 
and standard deviation of bank returns on assets as a measure of a bank’s insolvency risk. 
Since one of the components of this risk proxy relates bank assets to its capital (equity), it 
measures the bank’s loss resilience. Although this may go beyond a narrow definition of 
risk, it accounts for the fact that whether a bank’s level of risk is “high” or “low” is not a 
matter of absolute levels, but of how well a bank can weather unfavorable conditions given 
its capitalization base.
4 This in essence regulatory view of bank risk allows for a better 
comparability of risk between banks. 
Along these lines, we will use a similar measure – regulatory capital adequacy ratios – as a 
broad proxy for bank risk, or vulnerability of banks to the consequences of risk taking. The 
total capital adequacy ratio is defined as Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital as a percentage of risk-
weighted assets and off balance sheet risks (Bankscope). Lower capital ratios are 
associated with greater risk since losses can deplete bank capital more quickly. Admittedly, 
this measure has its weaknesses as well. It is not free of accounting differences across 
countries, although systematic country differences can be mitigated somewhat by choosing 
an appropriate estimation procedure (see section 3.2). It does not show to which extent 
changes in risk exposures over time stem from adjustments of asset quantity, asset quality 
or capital (but can be split in numerator and denominator to investigate these issues). 
Nonetheless, the capital adequacy ratio has important advantages for our large cross-
country sample of banks: the calculation of the ratio involves a detailed treatment of risks 
(weighting, on and off balance) and follows internationally uniform rules set by the Basel 
Committee.  
                                                 
4   Arguably, other risk measures such as those based on stock data or ratings incorporate capitalization 
information as well, along with other relevant risk factors. As an empirical example, Baele et al. (2004) 
show that stock returns of poorly capitalized banks reacted stronger to macroeconomic factors during 
periods of recession than those of well capitalized banks, implying that stock markets do perceive low 
capitalization as a risk. Olga Bohachova  IAW Diskussionspapier Nr. 44 
 
 
  10 
Alternatively, the ratio of total capital to risky assets (calculated as total assets less liquid 
assets) will be used to check the robustness of results. One should keep in mind, though, 
that this measure of risk is conceptually somewhat different from the capital adequacy ratio 
since it makes no differentiation in the degree of riskiness of asset classes and does not 
consider off-balance risks. Its advantage is that it can be calculated for virtually all banks 
whereas the capital adequacy ratio is available only for about a half of the banks in the 
sample. In regressions banks are dropped for which either of the ratios is negative or 
exceeds 100%, considering that these are atypical for the banking sector. This eliminates 
only a very small fraction of banks in the sample. 
3.3  Explanatory variables 
3.3.1  Macroeconomic conditions 
Of primary interest in subsequent regressions are macroeconomic conditions whose 
theoretical relationship with bank risk was briefly discussed in section 2. The annual rate 
of growth of real GDP at constant prices will be used as a broad measure of business cycle 
conditions. Since we do not intend to predict bank risk by macroeconomic factors, 
contemporaneous (as opposed to lagged)
5 GDP growth will be used. As a measure of real 
interest rate levels in a country, average rates on overnight interbank loans less inflation 
rate for a given year are taken. Since there are many different kinds of interest rates, this 
choice is dictated by data availability. Moreover, different kinds of interest rates usually 
co-move: rises in interbank rates reflect rises in policy interest rates and induce in turn 
rises of money market rates and usually long-term fixed-income securities yields (Görgens 
et al. 2004, p. 279). The terms of trade, the annual inflation rate, and the annual percentage 
change in a country’s exchange rate are also included in the model as explanatory 
variables.  
One must keep in mind, though, that these macroeconomic factors and conditions are not 
independent. To show just a few of the interdependencies, business cycles appear to be 
correlated with exchange rate movements, with currency appreciating during economic 
highs and depreciating during troughs, although this pattern is less apparent during some 
periods (IMF 1998). Interest rates are related to business cycles by way of expansionary or 
contracting impulses they send to the real economy. High inflation rates are likely to be 
                                                 




associated with weak currency in a country. The interdependence of macroeconomic 
factors reinforces their individual influence on bank risk, but can also make an empirical 
assessment of their relative importance for bank risk difficult. 
A look at correlation coefficients of explanatory macroeconomic variables shows that 
some of correlations are not neglectable, indicating that multicollinearity may indeed be a 
problem (see TABLE 3). Therefore it makes sense to run additional regressions where 
macroeconomic factors of interest are included individually in separate specifications 
(along with control variables). Interpreting the model where all macroeconomic variables 
are included simultaneously, one should keep in mind that the statistical significance of 
estimated coefficients might be weakened by the presence of collinear relationships. 
3.3.2  Country level (systemic) control variables 
All models contain a set of control variables that capture potentially risk-relevant effects. 
Since the presence of explicit deposit insurance was theorized to be conducive to moral 
hazard in banking (Matutes/Vives 2000) and was empirically shown to have a significant 
influence on the probability of a banking crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt/Detagiache 1998), a 
dummy variable is included that equals to one for countries that had explicit deposit 
insurance schemes in place for the period under consideration. 
The degree of concentration in the banking sector is gauged by the percentage share of the 
assets of three largest banks in total banking assets of a country. A greater degree of 
concentration implies lesser competition and thus higher charter values of banks (see 
Hellmann et al. (2000), Keeley (1990)). Theoretically, banks that experience less 
competition should show more risk aversion, ceteris paribus holding larger capital ratios.  
Furthermore, GDP per capita is included as an explanatory variable to control for banking 
sector differences stemming from the degree of economic development of a country. The 
direction of possible correlation of this variable with bank risk is open. It has been shown 
that affluent countries with higher GDP per capita are ceteris paribus less susceptible to 
banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt/Detagiache 1998). It is possible that banks in more affluent 
countries (which tend to be more advanced economically) are more prudent and thus hold 
higher capital relative to risk-weighted assets. It is also possible that, possessing more Olga Bohachova  IAW Diskussionspapier Nr. 44 
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refined techniques of risk measurement, they can afford it to have lower capital ratios 
which are still perceived to be risk-adequate.  
3.3.3  Bank level factors 
To control for bank level factors that reflect its risk-taking behavior, the rate of loan 
growth is included in the regressions, calculated as the mean percentage change over the 
previous two years. It has been observed that banking crises are often preceded by lending 
booms (Gavin/Hausmann 1998, Llewellyn 2002, Edwards/Végh 1997). Likewise, it is 
plausible that excessive credit growth at an individual bank fills the bank’s balance sheet 
with more risks.  
Another potentially relevant bank level variable is the degree of diversification. Similarly 
to Baele/Vander Vennet et al. (2004), functional diversification is gauged by calculating 
the share of a bank’s interest income in its total revenues; larger values indicate a smaller 
degree of functional diversification. Both variables contain a few values that are multiples 
of the next largest values in the sample; these were removed as extreme outliers. 
Furthermore, a few banks that had negative diversification values due to negative revenue 
or interest income were dropped since negative diversification makes no economical sense 
and would bias the results. 
Finally, the logarithm of bank assets is included to proxy for bank size, considering 
empirical findings that bank risk may increase in size (De Nicolo 2001). All models 
contain a full set of year dummies that capture systematic time influences. TABLE 2 gives 
a summarizing overview of all variables and their data sources. 
3.4  Estimation method 
Choosing an appropriate estimation method, it is important to take into account the 
hierarchical structure of the data at hand. First, it contains a time-series component: for 
each bank there are repeated observations during the period 2001-2005. These are likely to 
be correlated „within“ banks due to bank-specific factors. Second, banks are clustered 
within countries. It is reasonable to assume that country-specific correlations between 




Using linear mixed models methodology (see Rao 1997 or Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2005, 
pp. 217-228), bank-specific and country-specific effects will be estimated as random bank 
and country intercepts ζij and ζj in the following equation: 
ijt j ji t ijt jt jt ijt T C Z X ratio capital ε ζ ζ β β β β β + + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 _ 
Other equation components contain variables discussed above: capital_ratioijt is a vector of 
observations on the two alternative risk measures (capital adequacy ratio or the ratio of 
capital to unweighted risky assets), Xjt is a matrix of macroeconomic variables, which are 
of primary interest here, Zjt contains country level regulatory/systemic variables, Cijt is a 
matrix of bank level variables, Tt is a matrix of year dummies, and βi’s are vectors of fixed 
effects that are estimated across banks and countries. εijt is a normally and independently 
distributed error term, and subscripts i,  j, and t stand for bank, country and year, 
respectively. The above equation is estimated by restricted maximum likelihood. Estimated 
fixed effects and their standard errors are reported in TABLES 4 and 5. To save space, 
coefficients of year dummies are not reported since they are not particularly important for 
the purposes of this paper. 
It should be noted that estimation consistency relies on the fairly stringent assumption that 
compound errors ζij + ζj + εijt are uncorrelated with the regressors (also see Wooldridge 
2002, pp. 257-264). The standard approach to treating possible endogeneity – the use of 
instrumental variables – would require additional data that may not be accessible for a 
large number of countries. A simpler solution to use a fixed effects estimator 
(Skrondal/Rabe-Hesketh 2007, p. 282) would lead to an exclusion of time-invariant 
variables (such as deposit insurance) and imprecise estimates for those variables that 
exhibit only little variation over time.  
 
4.  Empirical results 
4.1  The effects of macroeconomic conditions on bank risk 
The main focus of the models is the relationship between bank risk and general economic 
conditions captured by the rate of GDP growth; it is included in all model specifications. Olga Bohachova  IAW Diskussionspapier Nr. 44 
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An association of banking distress with lower economic growth has been repeatedly found 
in empirical research on financial crises (Lindgren et al. 1996, Gorton 1988, 
Kaminsky/Reinhart 1999, Demirgüç-Kunt/Detagiache 1998/2005 etc.). At the individual 
bank level, there is evidence that bank profit volatility has a significant positive correlation 
with the volatility of GDP growth (Buch et al. 2007). Not surprisingly, econometric 
estimates of our model indicate that business cycle conditions have a significant impact on 
capital adequacy ratios of banks. While OECD banks show a strongly positive and 
statistically highly significant tendency to hold larger capital ratios during periods of faster 
GDP growth, non-OECD banks behave procyclically, holding smaller capital ratios during 
business cycle upturns (see TABLE 4). This implies that banks in economically advanced 
countries on average behave more prudently, apparently boosting their capital base during 
economically good times when it is easiest to do so. (Additional regressions with bank 
capital as a dependent variable confirm that capital of banks in OECD, particularly in EU-
15, countries moves in tandem with the business cycle.) During periods of slower or 
negative growth their capital ratios tend to decline, possibly reflecting the deterioration of 
asset quality and falling equity values. This pattern is equally evident in the subsampe of 
EU banks, whose capital ratios show an even stronger positive reaction to higher economic 
growth.  
Interestingly, Wedow (2006), who estimates the effect of business cycle fluctuations on 
capital buffers (defined as Basel Accord capital ratio minus 8%) of a panel of West 
German savings and cooperative banks in 1993-2003, finds strong evidence that banks’ 
capital buffers rise in business cycle downturns and fall during upturns. Although his 
results refer to a much narrower sample of banks and to a different time frame and are 
therefore not directly comparable to the results of this study, they suggest that differences 
between countries within relatively homogenous international banking communities are 
worth exploring in further studies. 
In non-OECD countries banks appear to follow theoretical lines described in section 2.1: 
more risks are taken during economic upswings, leading to lower capital ratios. However, 
this relationship is less robust in regressions with alternative capital ratios (capital over 
unweighted risky assets). The positive relationship between capital buffers and GDP 
growth remains highly statistically significant for OECD banks, including the EU 




some model specifications and often lacks statistical significance. Nonetheless, the general 
lack of significant positive correlation which was found for OECD countries shows that 
different mechanisms are at work in the non-OECD subsample, so that the negative 
relationship shown in the models with risk-weighted capital ratios appears to be plausible. 
As with GDP growth, the effect of exchange rate appreciation on bank risk is different for 
OECD and non-OECD countries. For the former this effect tends to be positive, although it 
becomes statistically significant at the 1% level only with the risk-unweighted capital ratio 
(see TABLE 5). This is found for the EU subsample as well. In non-OECD countries, the 
statistically significant estimates usually tend to be negative, implying that the appreciation 
of the currency leads to a fall in banks’ capital ratios. This result is consistent with the 
above findings on the relationship between banks’ capital buffers and business cycle 
fluctuations as expressed by growth rates: since the frequently observed empirical pattern 
has been the appreciation of the exchange rate during economic highs (IMF 1998) and 
there is also a positive correlation of GDP growth rates and currency appreciation in the 
data at hand (see TABLE 3), the reaction of banks’ capital ratios to medium-term exchange 
rate movements is likely to go in the same direction as their reaction to swings in overall 
economic activity.  
A difference in risk behavior of OECD and non-OECD countries can also be observed 
regarding their reactions to the changes in the terms of trade. While capital ratios of banks 
in economically advanced countries tend to rise as the terms of trade fall, which is another 
indication of prudent behavior, the correlation between the terms of trade and capital 
buffers of banks domiciled in non-OECD countries is positive and statistically significant, 
implying a positive welfare effect for banks associated with a terms of trade increase that is 
reflected in what might be a „passive adjustment“ of capital ratios. All in all, however, no 
firm conclusions can be drawn about the impact of the terms of trade shifts on bank risk 
since in many model specifications, particularly for the more homogenous samples of EU 
banks, the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant.  
Surprisingly, real interest rates proved to have a rather weak explanatory power across 
most model specifications. While the relationship between interest rates and capital 
adequacy ratios of banks in OECD countries is positive and statistically highly significant, 
it changes sign in regressions with capital over unweighted risky assets. For banks in non-Olga Bohachova  IAW Diskussionspapier Nr. 44 
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OECD countries, coefficients on the interest rate variable lack statistical significance in all 
model specifications. By contrast, researchers of macroeconomic determinants of banking 
crises have found a strong link between banking distress and higher interest rates 
(Kaminsky/Reinhart 1999, Demirgüç-Kunt/Detagiache 2005). Admittedly, the annual 
average of overnight interest rates variable used in this study may be too crude to capture 
the whole impact of interest rate changes on bank behavior. Besides, interest rates data 
were unavailable for over a half of countries in the sample. It is possible that an alternative 
interest rate measure or other model setups would produce less ambiguous results.  
Matters appear to be clearer for the impact of inflation on bank risk. Most model 
specifications with capital ratios as the dependent variable show a positive relationship 
between capital ratios and inflation. This can be an indication of the theoretical relationship 
shown in section 2.5: all else equal, higher inflation induces banks to ration credit thereby 
reducing their risky assets. Not surprisingly, this relationship is even more marked in 
regressions where capital over unweighted risk assets was used, since here the quantity 
effect of credit rationing is more transparent than in metrics with risk-weighted assets.
6 Of 
all macroeconomic variables, the response of bank risk to inflation appears to be the most 
uniform across countries worldwide. 
4.2  Country level control variables 
Results for systemic control variables are generally mixed. The coefficient of the deposit 
insurance dummy is negative and statistically significant for banks in non-OECD countries 
in most model specifications,
7 showing that banks in countries without explicit deposit 
insurance schemes tend to hold larger capital adequacy ratios. This supports the notion that 
explicit deposit insurance encourages risky behavior on the part of the banks (moral 
hazard). For banks in OECD countries, no significant relationship between capital ratios 
and deposit insurance could be found.
8  
                                                 
6 The only exception is the negative coefficient in model specification [5] for the subsample of EU-15 banks, 
which is significant at the 10% level (see TABLE 5). 
7 The robustness of this result is weakened by the change of sign in the model which includes the terms of 
trade and by the generally weaker statistical significance of the coefficients in models with unweighted 
risky assets. 
8 Considering that only two out of 27 OECD countries in the sample did not have explicit deposit insurance 
during the period under consideration, the explanatory power of the deposit insurance dummy in the 




The impact of general income levels in a country (measured as GDP per capita) has a 
positive and statistically strongly significant relationship with capital adequacy ratios of 
EU banks, implying that banks in more affluent European countries are generally less 
risky. However, the statistical significance for this subsample largely disappears in 
robustness tests with the ratio of capital to unweighted risky assets. By contrast, these 
regressions show that banks in non-OECD countries with higher GDP per capita tend to 
hold lower unweighted capital ratios; this is also the case for two model specifications with 
OECD subsample. 
Results are also mixed for the impact of banking sector concentration, measured as the 
share of assets of three largest banks in total bank assets, on bank risk. The theoretically 
plausible positive relationship between concentration and capital ratios (that is, a negative 
relationship between concentration and banks’ risk taking due to higher charter values) is 
confirmed in regressions with capital over unweighted risky assets and is also prevalent in 
baseline regressions with capital adequacy ratios for the subsamples of non-OECD and EU 
banks. By contrast, a counterintuitive positive relationship between risk and concentration 
in baseline regressions is found for OECD banks, which weakens the overall robustness of 
results for this variable. 
4.3  Bank level variables 
A look at statistically significant bank level control variables shows that both measures of 
bank risk are almost universally negatively related to bank size and the rate of loan growth. 
Thus, larger banks tend to hold lower capital ratios, all else equal. In this sense, they are 
more risky. This is largely in line with the findings of De Nicolo (2001). Similarly, more 
rapid loan growth over the past two years is associated with lower capital ratios. 
Furthermore, banks with a higher degree of specialization in lending business (measured as 
the percentage share of interest income in total revenues) tend to hold less capital, all else 
equal. This implies that specialized banks are more exposed to credit risk not only due to 
specialization itself, but also due to their risk practices of holding smaller capital cushions. 
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5.  Conclusions 
Risk taking and risk transformation belong to the core functions of banking. However, 
whenever risk taking becomes excessive so that the solvency of a bank is jeopardized, the 
consequences for the financial and the real sectors may be grave. Since adverse 
macroeconomic developments simultaneously affect a large number of institutions, it is 
important to understand macroeconomic influences on risk positions of banks. 
Theoretical and empirical research emphasizes the connection between the business cycle 
and bank risk. Generally, risks tend to accumulate on banks’ balance sheets during booms, 
often accompanied by rapid lending growth, and lead to losses during economic recessions 
when default rates of bank borrowers pick up while asset prices fall. However, results of 
this paper show that banks’ efforts to mitigate the accumulation of risks vary across 
countries. In economically advanced countries, banks tend to increase their capital ratios 
during booms, building up capital when it is easiest to do so, which would cushion a rise in 
losses during the next recession. In non-OECD countries, capital ratios rise during 
recessions, which may be explained by a substantial reduction in risk-weighted assets 
when losses are high and when macroeconomic risks prevail. 
The paper also shows that higher inflation rates are usually associated with higher capital 
buffers of banks. This implies that inflation-induced economic uncertainty appears to 
stimulate banks to restrict lending, possibly in order to mitigate adverse selection, since 
higher inflation usually leads to higher interest rates. Currency appreciation appears to 
have a negative, albeit statistically less robust, relationship with bank risk in OECD 
countries. Also, results for the terms of trade and changes in market interest rates are not 
very robust.  
For country level variables other than macroeconomic factors, econometric results 
obtained in this study are frequently in line with theoretical predictions, although some of 
them turn out to be insufficiently robust. Banks in non-OECD countries with explicit 
deposit insurance schemes tend to hold smaller capital adequacy ratios und thus assume 
riskier positions, which theory predicts to be a result of moral hazard incentives of deposit 
insurance. The impact of general income levels in a country (measured as GDP per capita) 
on capital adequacy ratios was shown to be positive for EU banks, implying that banks in 




results is not very strong. Results are also mixed for the impact of banking sector 
concentration on bank risk, where the theoretically plausible negative relationship between 
concentration (higher concentration meaning higher charter values of banks) and banks’ 
risk taking holds for most model setups, but fails to be confirmed in baseline regressions 
with OECD banks.  
While this paper presents an overall view of possible connections between macroeconomic 
factors and individual bank risk in an international perspective, some extensions can 
provide a fruitful ground for further research. First, it remains open to what extent 
individual bank risk in an open economy may be affected by macroeconomic 
developments or shocks abroad. Second, a broader view of bank risk should explore more 
extensively the role microeconomic factors alongside macroeconomic fundamentals. Third, 
although regression results point to some statistically significant relationships between 
macroeconomic fundamentals and banks’ risk-taking behavior, cross-sample variations in 
these relationships (e.g., OECD countries vs. non-OECD countries) suggest that responses 
of bank behavior to macroeconomic developments are fairly heterogeneous. 
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Table 1:  Sample description 
Country 
Obser- 
vations Banks  Country 
Obser- 
vations Banks  Country 
Obser- 
vations Banks
Albania 23  5  Guatemala  105  21  Pakistan  74  15 
Algeria 8  2  Guyana  8  2  Panama 50  10 
Angola 8  2  Honduras  40  8  Paraguay  63  13 
Argentina 170  38  Hong  Kong  5  1  Peru  50  10 
Armenia 15  3  Hungary  90  18  Philippines  25  6 
Australia 6  2  Iceland  2  2  Poland  55  11 
Austria 584  117  India  186  38  Portugal  28  7 
Azerbaijan 18  4  Indonesia  182  38  Qatar  20  4 
Bahamas 36  8  Iran  8  2  Romania  71  15 
Bahrain 41  9  Ireland  60  12  Russia  188  39 
Bangladesh 126  26  Israel 50  10  Saudi  Arabia 45  9 
Belarus 30  6  Italy  2045  410  Senegal  20  5 
Belgium 197  41  Japan  2830  567  Sierra  Leone  15  4 
Bolivia 60  12  Jordan  68  14  Singapore  5  1 
Botswana 8  2  Kazakhstan  54 11  Slovak  Republic  50  10 
Brazil 258  53  Kenya  98  20  Slovenia  48  12 
Bulgaria 72  15  Korea  75  15  South  Africa  10  2 
Burkina Faso  20  5  Kuwait  55  12  Sri Lanka  37  8 
Cameroon 15  4  Latvia  45  9  Sudan  8  2 
Canada 149  30  Lebanon  115  23  Sweden  80  16 
Chile 75  15  Libya  7  2  Switzerland  906  188 
China 92  19  Lithuania  30  6  Syria  1  1 
Colombia 84  17  Luxembourg  320  69  Taiwan  165  33 
Congo 2  1  Madagascar  12  3  Tanzania  5  1 
Costa Rica  55  11  Malawi  7  2  Thailand  75  15 
Croatia 90  18  Malaysia  155  32  Togo  2  1 
Cuba 7  2  Mali  12  3  Trinidad  &  Tobago  35  7 
Cyprus 41  9  Malta  25  5  Tunisia  20  4 
Czech Republic  69  14  Mexico  56  15  Turkey  69  14 
Denmark 295  59  Moldova  21  5  Uganda  49  10 
Dominican Republic  35  7  Mongolia  8  2  Ukraine  75  15 
Egypt 130  26  Morocco  28  7  United  Arab  Emirates  90  18 
El Salvador  30  6  Mozambique  12  3  United Kingdom  477  107 
Estonia 20  4  Netherlands  60  12  Uruguay 15  3 
Ethiopia 25  5  New  Zealand  15  3  United  States  4,401  882 
Finland 5  1  Nicaragua  12  3  Venezuela  111  23 
France 727  149  Niger  8  2  Vietnam 79  16 
Gambia 2  1  Nigeria  59  12  Yemen,  Republic  16  4 
Germany 5,830  1,171  Norway  80  16  Zambia  37  8 
Ghana 68  14  Oman  30  6  Zimbabwe  28  8 
Total observations:  24,202    Total banks:  4,931    Total countries:  120   
Source:   Bankscope, own calculations. Table contains numbers for maximum sample size. Sample sizes vary substantially across 
regressions, constrained by data availability on explanatory variables. Olga Bohachova  IAW Diskussionspapier Nr. 44 
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Table 2:  Description of variables and their data sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
 
(Alternative) dependent variables: 
 
Capital adequacy ratio  Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets 
and off balance sheet risks (as reported by banks) 
Bankscope 
Ratio of capital to risky 
assets 




GDP growth   Annual percentage change of real gross domestic product, in 
constant prices 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Currency appreciation  Annual percentage change of nominal exchange rate against the 
dollar (against the euro in case of the United States). Positive 
values indicate currency appreciation. 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Real interest rate  Annual average of interest rates on overnight bank loans minus 
annual inflation rate 
Datastream 
Inflation  Annual rate of inflation as unweighted average of Consumer 
Price Index 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Terms of trade  Net barter terms of trade (2000 = 100)  World Development 
Indicators 
GDP per capita  Annual gross domestic product per head of population in 
thousand USD 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Deposit insurance  Dummy; 1 if an explicit deposit insurance scheme in place  Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005
Concentration of banking 
sector 
Share of assets of three largest banks in a country in total bank 
assets 
Beck et al. (updated 2007) 
Bank size  Natural logarithm of bank's assets  Bankscope 
Loan growth  Average percentage change in loan volume over the past two 
years (three data points) 
Bankscope 
Degree of functional 
specialization 
Share of interest income in a bank's total revenue  Bankscope 
  
Table 3:  Pairwise correlations between macroeconomic indicators 







GDP growth  1     
Currency appreciation  0.2054*** 1     
Terms of trade  -0.0094*** -0.0323***  1   
Real interest rate  -0.3546*** -0.2347*** 0.0512***  1 
Inflation rate  -0.1825*** -0.9098*** 0.0134*** -0.1102*** 
*** significant at 1% level in a two-tailed t-test.Bohachova (2008): The Impact of Macroeconomic Factors on Risks in the Banking Sector 
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Table 4: Regressions with capital adequacy ratio 
Results presented in this table are based on a restricted maximum likelihood estimation of a linear mixed effects model with year dummies. In each regression, the dependant variable 
is the capital adequacy ratio of a bank, defined as Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital over risk-weighted assets and off-balance-sheet risks. Each regression is run for OECD, EU-15 and non-
OECD countries separately. Regressions [1]-[5] include one further macroeconomic variable of interest at a time, to limit multicollinearity effects, regression [6] contains all 
explanatory variables. The Wald chi-squared statistic reports the overall significance of each specification. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% in a two-tailed t-test.  
   [1]    [2]    [3]   [4]   [5]    [6]  
  
OECD EU-15  Non-
OECD 
OECD EU-15  Non-
OECD 




OECD EU-15  Non-
OECD 
OECD EU-15  Non-
OECD 
























































































































































































































































































































Observations  7914  2789 2525 7914  2789 2525 7736  2716 1320 7604  1367  7914  2789 2525 7461  2446 834 
Number of banks  1707 628  625 1707 628  625 1663 612  372 1637 329 1707 628  625 1605 554  227 
Number of 
countries 
27 13 75 27 13 75 22 12 44 24 19 27 13 75 21 11 13 
Wald chi-squared  647.28 407.21 349.05 649.61 407.09 366.69 710.84 418.91 248.49 671.59 308.70 652.78 407.48 377.58 729.27 432.34 237.93 
p-value  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Table 5: Regressions with unweigted ratio of risky assets over capital (robustness test) 
Results presented in this table are based on a restricted maximum likelihood estimation of a linear mixed effects model with year dummies. In each regression, the dependant variable 
is the ratio of bank capital to risky assets, calculated as total assets less liquid assets. Each regression is run for OECD, EU-15 and non-OECD countries separately. Regressions [1]-
[5] include one further macroeconomic variable of interest at a time, to limit multicollinearity effects, regression [6] contains all explanatory variables. The Wald chi-squared statistic 
reports the overall significance of each specification. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% in a two-tailed t-
test.  
   [1]    [2]    [3]   [4]   [5]    [6]  
  
OECD EU-15  Non-
OECD 
OECD EU-15  Non-
OECD 




OECD EU-15  Non-
OECD 
OECD EU-15  Non-
OECD 























































































































































































































































































































Observations  19505  10708 4697 19505  10708 4697 18151  10381 2586 18289 1980 19505  10708 4697 17843  10086 1251 
Number  of  banks  3943  2171 988 3943  2171 988 3660  2102 637 3694 422 3943  2171 988 3601  2043 304 
Number  of  countries  27 13 93 27 13 93 22 12 60 24 21 27 13 93 21 11 15 
Wald chi-squared  1553.3 1428.11 682.96 1564.49  1433.25 776.48 1021.64  1405.48 436.70 1166.55 445.73 1686.61  1448.37 791.16 1171.25  1401.72 369.36 
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